Macrofinancial responsibility of central banks: theoretical foundations and institutional dilemmas



Introduction. Postcrisis tendency to enhance central bank’s macrofinancial responsibility should be related to real-financial inter-linkages rethinking but not to activistic demand management. Different approaches on how price stability and financial stability are inter-related, as well, as different institutional modalities of how to achieve them are making more complicate optimal institutional design of central bank with increased zone of responsibility.

Purpose. Taking into account different macroeconomic viewpoints on the role of financial instability in macroeconomic fluctuations and institutional challenges for central bank independence the purpose of the paper is to validate that enhanced macrofinancial responsibility of central banks should be balanced by additional measures in direction to facilitate autonomous regulatory status.

Results. Different views on how to enhance macroeconomic stability and what the role of central banks in new macrofinancial environment provide serious challenge for optimal designing of central bank’s macrofinancial responsibility. The problem not only relate to how price and financial stability are inter-related but also to how define the wrong way policy then price and financial stability are in non-linear relations. The difficulties in this segment may affect far reaching political consequences while assessing central bank from political economy point of view. Also it is necessary to take into account that macroprudential toolkit may overlap with monetary policy instruments providing additional regulatory distortions. Clear institutialisation of relations between price and financial stability responsibilities will help to avoid political economy type of manipulations with central bank new tasks. Priority of price stability should be kept while financial stability mandate should be clarified and tied to macroprudential regulation. In the same time more active central bank’s participance in the post-crisis economy should be based not on standard Keynesian activism but on enhanced financial responsibility balanced with protection of central bank independence in new regulatory areas.

Conclusions. It the article it is stressed that enhanced macrofinancial responsibility should be based on unchanged priority of price stability mandate, increased level of central bank independence and coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies. It is shown that vulnerability of macrofinancial responsibilities to political pressure is going to increase. Political independence of central banks should protect them in the area of price stability and financial stability all together.

Ключові слова

macrofinancial linkages; central banks independence; financial stability

Повний текст:



Claessens, S. (2014). An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools. IMF Working Paper. WP/14/214, 1–37.

Claessens, S., Ghosh, S., Mihet, R. (2014). Macro-Prudential Policies to Mitigate Financial System Vulnerabilities. IMF Working Paper. WP/14/155, 1–35.

Borio, C. (2014). Monetary Policy and Financial Stability : What Role in Prevention and Recovery? BIS Working Paper, 440, 1–23.

Borio, C. (2006). Monetary and Prudential Policies at a Crossroads? New Challenges in the New Century. BIS Working Paper, 193, 2–28.

Borio, C., White, W. (2004). Whither Monetary and Financial Stability? The Implications of Evolving Policy Regims. BIS Working Paper, 147, 1–51.

Borio, C., Lowe, Ph. (2004). Securing Sustainable Price Stability : Should Credit Come Back from the Wilderness? BIS Working Paper, 157, 1–51.

Smets, F. (2014). Financial Stability and Monetary Policy : How Closely Interlinked? International Journal of Central Banking, 10(2), 263–300.

Bauducco, S., Bulir, A., Cihak, M. (2008). Taylor Rule Under Financial Instability. IMF Working Paper. WP/08/18, 1–43.

Cecchetti, St., Li, L. (2005). Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter for Monetary Policy? NBER Working Paper, 11830.

Bulir, A., Cihak, M. (2008). Central Bankers’ Dilemma When Banks Are Vulnerable : To Tighten or not to Tighten? IMF. Mimeo.

Cihak, M. (2010). Price Stability, Financial Stability, and Central Bank Independence. Oesterreichische Nationalbank 38th Economic Conference. Wiena.

Cihak, M. (2007). Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability. IMF. Mimeo.

Bordo, M. (2010). Central Bank Independence and Financial Crises in History. Oesterreichische Nationalbank 38th Economic Conference. Wiena.

Balls, Ed, Howart, J., Stansbury, A. (2016). Central Bank Independence Revisited : After the Financial Crisis, What Should a Model Central Bank Look Like? Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government Working Paper, 67, 1–113.

Bayoumi, T., Dell’Ariccia, G., Habermeier, K. Mancini-Griffoli, T., Valencia, F. (2014). Monetary Policy in the New Normal. IMF Staff Discussion Note. SDN/14/3, 1–48.

Eichengreen, B., El-Erian, M., Fraga, A., Ito, T., Pisani-Ferry, J., Prasad, E., Rajan, R., Ramos, M., Reinhart, C., Rey, H., Rodrick, D., Rogoff, K., Song Shin, H., Velasco, A., Weder di Mauro, B., Yu, Y. (2011). Rethinking Central Banking: Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform. Brookings. Wash. (D.C.).

IMF. (2015). Monetary Policy and Financial Stability. Staff Report. – Sept, 1–66.

Masciandro, D., Quintyn, M., Taylor, M. (2008). Inside and Outside the Central Bank : Independence and Accountobility in Financial Supervision : Trends and Determinants. European Journal of Political Economy, 24, (4), 833–848.

Acharya, V. (2015). Financial Stability in the Broader Mandate for Central Banks : A Political Economy Perspective. Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings Working Paper, 11, 1–19.

Kydland, F., Prescott, E. (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion : The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473–492.

Koziuk, V. (2009). Monetarni zasady hlobalnoi finansovoi stabilnosti [Monetary foundations for global financial stability]. Ternopil : Economichna dumka [in Ukrainian].

Koziuk, V. (2015). Rezervni valiuty : hlobalnyi perymetr nestabilnosti [Reserve currencies : global perimeter of instability]. Ternopil : Aston [in Ukrainian].

Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. (1999). Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Volatility. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review. Issue QIV, 17–51.

Klomp, J., de Haan, J. (2009). Central Bank Independence and Financial Instability. Journal of Financial Stability. Dec.

Svensson, L. (2012). Comment on Michael Woodford, Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability. Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 1, 33–39.

Svensson, L. (2016). Cost-Benefits Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind : Are Costs Larger Also with Less Effective Macroprudential Policy? IMF Working Paper. WP/16/3, 1–76.

Dincer, N., Eichengreen, B. (2014). Central Bank Transparency and Independence : Updates and New Measures”. International Journal of Central Banking, 10 (1), 189–253.

Bodea, Cr., Hicks, R. (2012). Price Stability and Central Bank Independence : Discipline, Credibility and Democratic Institutions. November 6, 1–42.

Koziuk, V. (2016). Nezalezhnist tsentralnykh bankiv u syrovynnykh ekonomikakh [Independence of central banks in commodity economies]. Visnyk NBU – Bulletin of the NBU, March, 6–25.

Koziuk, V. (2015). Nezalezhnist tsentralnykh bankiv pislia hlobalnoi finansovoi krysy: “sira zona status-kvo” [Central bank independence after global financial crisis: “grey zone of status-quo]. Visnyk NBU – Bulletin of the NBU, Feb, 16–25.

Blanchard, O., Dell’Ariccia, G., Mauro, P. (2010). Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy. IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/10/03, 1–19.

Haan, J. de, Masciandro, D., Quintyn, M. (Eds.). (2008). Does Central Bank Independence Still Matter. European Journal of Political Economy, 24 (4), 717–848.



  • Поки немає зовнішніх посилань.

ISSN 1818-5754 (print), ISSN 2415-3672 (online)
Ternopil National Economic University
© "WOF", 2004-2019